An efficient characterization of submodular spanning tree games

@article{Koh2019AnEC,
  title={An efficient characterization of submodular spanning tree games},
  author={Zhuan Khye Koh and Laura Sanit{\`a}},
  journal={Mathematical Programming},
  year={2019},
  volume={183},
  pages={359 - 377}
}
Cooperative games form an important class of problems in game theory, where a key goal is to distribute a value among a set of players who are allowed to cooperate by forming coalitions. An outcome of the game is given by an allocation vector that assigns a value share to each player. A crucial aspect of such games is submodularity (or convexity ). Indeed, convex instances of cooperative games exhibit several nice properties, e.g. regarding the existence and computation of allocations realizing… 

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