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# An axiomatization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution when the feasible sets can be finite

@article{Nagahisa2002AnAO, title={An axiomatization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution when the feasible sets can be finite}, author={Ryo-ichi Nagahisa and Makoto Tanaka}, journal={Social Choice and Welfare}, year={2002}, volume={19}, pages={751-761} }

- Published 2002 in Social Choice and Welfare
DOI:10.1007/s003550100150

We axiomatize the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (1975) in the Nash bargaining problems if the feasible sets can be finite. We show that the KalaiSmorodinsky solution is the unique solution satisfying Continuity (in the Hausdor¤ topology endowed with payo¤s space), Independence (which is weaker than Nash’s one and essentially equivalent to Roth (1977)’s one), Symmetry, Invariance (both of which are the same as in Kalai and Smorodinsky), and Monotonicity (which reduces to a little bit weaker version… CONTINUE READING