• Corpus ID: 17804702

An approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions using value queries

  title={An approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions using value queries},
  author={Shaddin Dughmi and Tim Roughgarden and Jan Vondr{\'a}k and Qiqi Yan},
This manuscript presents an alternative implementation of the truthful-in-expectation mechanism of Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan for combinatorial auctions with weighted-matroid-rank-sum valuations. The new implementation uses only value queries and is approximately truthful-in-expectation, in the sense that by reporting truthfully each agent maximizes his utility within a multiplicative 1-o(1) factor. It still provides an optimal (1-1/e-o(1))-approximation in social welfare. We achieve this by… 
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