An analysis of Iraqi WMD strategy

  title={An analysis of Iraqi WMD strategy},
  author={Amatzia Baram},
  journal={The Nonproliferation Review},
  pages={25 - 39}
When Saddam Hussein launched the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program in the early 1970s, he aimed primarily to develop a deterrent capability. As the program advanced, however, the Iraqi leader came to view these weapons as a tool that could be used “to re-shape the map of the Middle East” through nuclear threats and coercion. Saddam apparently hoped to elevate Iraq to regional superpower status through the use of such threats, which escalated as Iraqi WMD capabilities increased… Expand
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The conference was dedicated to detonation and organized by several U.S. governmental bodies
  • oil revenues were $521 million (m), $840 m, and $575 m respectively. Between 1973 and 1975, they rocketed to $1,843 m, $5,700 m, and $7,500 m respectively. See Richard F. Nyrop
  • 1970
21; and the speech of the commander of the Iraqi Air Force, Major-General Muzahim Sab Hasan in Radio Monte Carlo
43 Speech by Saddam Hussein on the occasion of the Gulf War anniversary
51 A cable was sent to Saddam by his extended family announcing that they killed the Kamil brothers to redeem the family's honor. See al-Jumhuriyya
  • Endgame. 50 UNSCOM officials (names withheld by request)
At the time, Al-Muharrir was an Iraqisupported Arabic language newspaper