An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm

  title={An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm},
  author={Thayer Morrill},
  journal={Int. J. Game Theory},
Kojima and Manea (2010) present two characterizations of when an allocation rule corresponds to the agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm for some substitutable priority rule of the objects being assigned. Building on their results we characterize when an allocation rule is outcome equivalent to the deferred acceptance algorithm for every substitutable priority rule. In particular, an assignment rule satisfies mutual best if an agent is always assigned her most preferred object whenever… CONTINUE READING

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