An Introduction to Game Theory for Linguists

@inproceedings{Benz2006AnIT,
  title={An Introduction to Game Theory for Linguists},
  author={Anton Benz and Gerhard J{\"a}ger and Robert van Rooij},
  year={2006}
}
In a very general sense we can say that we play a game together with other people whenever we have to decide between several actions such that the decision depends on the choice of actions by others and on our preferences over the ultimate results. Obvious examples are card games, chess, or soccer. If I am to play a card to a trick, then it depends on the cards played by my playing partners whether or not I win the trick. Whether my move in chess leads to a win usually depends on the subsequent… 
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