• Corpus ID: 85512930

An Informational Theory of Electoral Targeting : Evidence from Senegal ∗

@inproceedings{Gottlieb2015AnIT,
  title={An Informational Theory of Electoral Targeting : Evidence from Senegal ∗},
  author={Jessica J. Gottlieb and Horacio Larreguy},
  year={2015}
}
To explain the puzzle of why parties target “core” supporters and reconcile existing theories with contradictory empirics that show significant vote switching, we propose and test a theory of group-level targeting driven by new incumbents learning about groups’ capacity to coordinate votes. Unlike current theories, ours assumes that most groups are nonpartisan and respond to prior transfers as a function of their latent coordinating capacity. The targeting of “core” supporters and significant… 

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