An Informational Perspective on Administrative Procedures

@article{Figueiredo1999AnIP,
  title={An Informational Perspective on Administrative Procedures},
  author={Rui J. P. de Figueiredo and Pablo T. Spiller and Santiago Urbiztondo},
  journal={Journal of Law Economics \& Organization},
  year={1999},
  volume={15},
  pages={283-305}
}
A number of scholars have identified the important role administrative procedures have in 'structuring' the interest group environment of government agencies: determining who can participate and in what manner. Using a formal model, we analyze the incentives and outcomes that different procedural--and therefore interest group--environments generate. The model yields a number of important conclusions. First, because elected officials are concerned not only about distributional rents, but also… 

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