An Incentive Compatible, Efficient Market for Air Traffic Flow Management

  title={An Incentive Compatible, Efficient Market for Air Traffic Flow Management},
  author={Ruta Mehta and Vijay V. Vazirani},
  journal={Theor. Comput. Sci.},
We present a market-based approach to the Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) problem. The goods in our market are delays and buyers are airline companies; the latter pay money to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to buy away the desired amount of delay on a per flight basis. We give a notion of equilibrium for this market and an LP whose every optimal solution gives an equilibrium allocation of flights to landing slots as well as equilibrium prices for the landing slots. Via a reduction… 
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