Corpus ID: 209832374

An FBSDE approach to market impact games with stochastic parameters

  title={An FBSDE approach to market impact games with stochastic parameters},
  author={Samuel Drapeau and Peng Luo and Alexander Schied and Dewen Xiong},
  journal={arXiv: Trading and Market Microstructure},
We analyze a market impact game between $n$ risk averse agents who compete for liquidity in a market impact model with permanent price impact and additional slippage. Most market parameters, including volatility and drift, are allowed to vary stochastically. Our first main result characterizes the Nash equilibrium in terms of a fully coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). Our second main result provides conditions under which this system of FBSDEs has… Expand

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