An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process

  title={An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process},
  author={Otto A. Davis and Melvin J. Hinich and Peter C. Ordeshook},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
The fundamental process of politics is the aggregation of citizens' preferences into a collective—a social—choice. We develop, interpret, and explain non-technically in this expository essay the definitions, assumptions, and theorems of a mathematical model of one aggregative mechanism—the electoral process. This mechanism is conceptualized here as a multidimensional model of spatial competition in which competition consists of candidates affecting turnout and the electorate's perception… 
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