An Ex-Post E¢cient Auction¤

  title={An Ex-Post E¢cient Auction¤},
  author={Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny},
An analogue of Vickrey’s (1961) multi-unit auction is provided when bidders have interdependent values. The analogue is strategically equivalent to a collection of two-bidder single-unit second-price auctions and it possesses an ex-post e¢cient equilibrium. As an application of this result, it is shown that the FCC auction possesses an e¢cient equilibrium in the case of homogeneous goods. Conditions are provided under which the new auction (and also the FCC auction) revenue-dominates all ex… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Figures, tables, and topics from this paper.

Explore Further: Topics Discussed in This Paper


Publications referenced by this paper.

Auctions and Privatization,

  • E. Maskin
  • 1992
Highly Influential
9 Excerpts

E¢cient Auctions,

  • P. Dasgupta, E. Maskin
  • forthcoming, Quarterly Journal of Economics.
  • 1999
Highly Influential
4 Excerpts

Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders,

  • W. Vickrey
  • Quarterly Journal of Economics,
  • 1961
Highly Influential
5 Excerpts

Multipart Pricing of Public Goods,

  • E. Clarke
  • Public Choice,
  • 1971
1 Excerpt

: “ A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

  • W. Vickrey

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…