An Evolutionary Game-Based Mechanism for Routing P2P Network Flow among Selfish Peers

  title={An Evolutionary Game-Based Mechanism for Routing P2P Network Flow among Selfish Peers},
  author={Fang Zuo and Wei Zhang},
  journal={J. Networks},
  • Fang Zuo, Wei Zhang
  • Published 2014
  • Computer Science
  • J. Networks
Aimed to improving the efficiency of self-interested P2P node’s routing traffic through a congested network and overcoming confusion condition caused by selfish routing in P2P networks, we introduce an evolution game-based routing model to study the selfish routing behaviors of nodes in P2P networks. In the paper, we model the routing behaviors of nodes as a noncooperative routing game, in which self-interested player’s route traffic through a congestion-sensitive network. We extend the model… 
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