An Epistemic Foundation for Authentication Logics (Extended Abstract)

  title={An Epistemic Foundation for Authentication Logics (Extended Abstract)},
  author={Joseph Y. Halpern and Ron van der Meyden and Riccardo Pucella},
While there have been many attempts, going back to BAN logic, to base reasoning about security protocols on epistemic notions, they have not been all that successful. Arguably, this has been due to the particular logics chosen. We present a simple logic based on the well-understood modal operators of knowledge, time, and probability, and show that it is able to handle issues that have often been swept under the rug by other approaches, while being flexible enough to capture all the higher… 

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