An Epistemic Conception of Democracy

@article{Cohen1986AnEC,
  title={An Epistemic Conception of Democracy},
  author={Joshua Cohen},
  journal={Ethics},
  year={1986},
  volume={97},
  pages={26 - 38}
}
Following common practice, Riker's Liberalism against Populism distinguishes populist from liberal conceptions of democracy.1 Intuitively, populist conceptions emphasize that political participation and public deliberation can serve to articulate and advance a "general will," while liberal conceptions emphasize the role of regular electoral tests in limiting the power of public officials. Riker assesses these two conceptions in light of social choice theory and draws two main conclusions from… 

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References

See Pateman for a discussion of these concerns