An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices

@inproceedings{Leech2001AnEC,
  title={An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices},
  author={Dennis Leech},
  year={2001}
}
Power indices are general measures of the relative a priori voting power of individual members of a voting body. They are useful for both positive and normative analysis of voting bodies particularly those using weighted voting. This paper applies new algorithms for computing the rival Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices for large voting bodies to shareholder voting power in a cross section of British companies. Each company is a separate voting body and there is much variation in ownership… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Figures, tables, and topics from this paper.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 33 references

The relationship between shareholding concentration and shareholder voting power in British companies: a study of the application of power indices for simple games

D. Leech
Management Science, • 1988
View 6 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

The bicameral postulates and indices of a priori voting power

D. S. Felsenthal, M. Machover, W. Zwicker
Theory and Decision, • 1998
View 4 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

Math. Oper. Res. • 1979
View 2 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

The Modern Corporation and Private Property

A. A. Berle, G. C. Means
1932
View 3 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games

Management Science • 2003
View 3 Excerpts

Designing the voting system for the Council of the European Union’, Public Choice, forthcoming

D. Leech
2002
View 2 Excerpts

Shareholder voting power and corporate governance: a study of large British companies

D. Leech
Nordic Journal of Political Economy, • 2002
View 2 Excerpts

Corporate Ownership around the World

Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
1998
View 3 Excerpts

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…