An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy

@article{Downs1957AnET,
  title={An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy},
  author={A. Downs},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  year={1957},
  volume={65},
  pages={135 - 150}
}
  • A. Downs
  • Published 1957
  • Economics
  • Journal of Political Economy
IN SPITE of the tremendous importance of government decisions in every phase of economic life, economic theorists have never successfully integrated government with private decision-makers in a single general equilibrium theory. Instead they have treated government action as an exogenous variable, determined by political considerations that lie outside the purview of economics. This view is really a carry-over from the classical premise that the private sector is a self-regulating mechanism and… Expand
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References

SHOWING 1-3 OF 3 REFERENCES
Being informed is per se a value for him
  • Being informed is per se a value for him
He can believe that the election is going to be so close that his casting will decide the outcome 3. He wants to influence others
  • He can believe that the election is going to be so close that his casting will decide the outcome 3. He wants to influence others
He wants to influence the government (lobbyist) Case2: knowledge is imperfect, information costly
  • He wants to influence the government (lobbyist) Case2: knowledge is imperfect, information costly