An Economic Response to Unsolicited Communication

@article{Loder2005AnER,
  title={An Economic Response to Unsolicited Communication},
  author={Theodore Loder and Marshall W. Van Alstyne and Rick Wash},
  journal={Advances in Economic Analysis \& Policy},
  year={2005},
  volume={6}
}
Abstract If communication involves some transactions cost to both sender and recipient, what policy ensures that correct messages -- those with positive social surplus –- get sent? Filters block messages that harm recipients but benefit senders by more than transactions costs. Taxes can block positive value messages, and allow harmful messages through. In contrast, we propose an ``Attention Bond,'' allowing recipients to define a price that senders must risk to deliver the initial message.The… 

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