An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations

  title={An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations},
  author={Paul R. Milgrom and John Roberts},
  journal={American Journal of Sociology},
  pages={S154 - S179}
Members of organizations spend considerable time, effort, and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers. Such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization, but they also involve real costs. This essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational, self-interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization's structure and polices should respond to the incentives for… 

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