An Antirealist Explanation of the Success of Science

@inproceedings{Stanford2000AnAE,
  title={An Antirealist Explanation of the Success of Science},
  author={P. Kyle Stanford},
  year={2000}
}
  • P. Kyle Stanford
  • Published 2000
  • Philosophy
  • I develop an account of predictive similarity that allows even Antirealists who accept a correspondence conception of truth to answer the Realist demand (recently given sophisticated reformulations by Musgrave and Leplin) to explain the success of particular scientific theories by appeal to some intrinsic feature of those theories (notwithstanding the failure of past efforts by van Fraassen, Fine, and Laudan). I conclude by arguing that we have no reason to find truth a better (i.e., more… CONTINUE READING

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