An Analysis of Anonymity in Bitcoin Using P2P Network Traffic

@inproceedings{Koshy2014AnAO,
  title={An Analysis of Anonymity in Bitcoin Using P2P Network Traffic},
  author={Philips Koshy and Diana Koshy and Patrick Mcdaniel},
  booktitle={Financial Cryptography},
  year={2014}
}
Over the last 4 years, Bitcoin, a decentralized P2P crypto-currency, has gained widespread attention. [] Key Method We developed heuristics for identifying ownership relationships between Bitcoin addresses and IP addresses. We discuss the circumstances under which these relationships become apparent and demonstrate how nearly 1,000 Bitcoin addresses can be mapped to their likely owner IPs by leveraging anomalous relaying behavior.

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...

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