An Algorithmic Solution to the Blotto Game using Multi-marginal Couplings

@article{Perchet2022AnAS,
  title={An Algorithmic Solution to the Blotto Game using Multi-marginal Couplings},
  author={Vianney Perchet and Philippe Rigollet and Thibaut Le Gouic},
  journal={Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},
  year={2022}
}
A century ago, Emile Borel published his seminal paper on the theory of play and integral equations with skew-symmetric kernels[1]. Borel describes what is now called the Blotto game: a resource-allocation game in which two players compete for over n different battlefields by simultaneously allocating resources to each battlefield. The following two additional characteristics are perhaps the most salient features of the Blotto game: Winner-takes-all: For each battlefield, the player allocating… 

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