An Agent – Based Model of Tax Compliance with Social Networks

  title={An Agent – Based Model of Tax Compliance with Social Networks},
  author={Adam Korobow and Chris Johnson and Robert Axtell},
589 National Tax Journal Vol. LX, No. 3 September 2007 Abstract In this paper, we use a computational modeling approach to examine the long–standing social issue of tax compliance. Specifi cally, we design an agent–based model—the Networked Agent–Based Compliance Model (NACSM)—where taxpayers not only exist within localized social networks, but also possess heterogeneous characteristics such as perceptions about the likelihood of audit and apprehension. When making compliance decisions, agents… CONTINUE READING


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