An‐arrgh‐chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization

@article{Leeson2007AnarrghchyTL,
  title={An‐arrgh‐chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization},
  author={Peter T. Leeson},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  year={2007},
  volume={115},
  pages={1049 - 1094}
}
  • P. Leeson
  • Published 2 May 2007
  • History
  • Journal of Political Economy
This article investigates the internal governance institutions of violent criminal enterprise by examining the law, economics, and organization of pirates. To effectively organize their banditry, pirates required mechanisms to prevent internal predation, minimize crew conflict, and maximize piratical profit. Pirates devised two institutions for this purpose. First, I analyze the system of piratical checks and balances crews used to constrain captain predation. Second, I examine how pirates used… 
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