American Interests and IMF Lending

  title={American Interests and IMF Lending},
  author={Thomas Oatley and Jason Webb Yackee},
  journal={International Politics},
Does the United States shape the content of International Monetary Fund conditionality agreements? If so, in pursuit of what goals does the United States use its influence? We present evidence that American interests do shape the content of IMF conditionality agreements. We find that American policymakers use their influence in the IMF to pursue American financial and foreign policy objectives. The IMF offers larger loans to countries heavily indebted to American commercial banks than to other… 
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Aid and the political economy of policy change
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  • 2000