America and Trade Liberalization: The Limits of Institutional Reform

@article{Goldstein2014AmericaAT,
  title={America and Trade Liberalization: The Limits of Institutional Reform},
  author={Judith S. Goldstein and Robert J. Gulotty},
  journal={International Organization},
  year={2014},
  volume={68},
  pages={263 - 295}
}
Abstract Among scholars, delegation of power to the US president in 1934 is widely believed to have been a necessary requisite for tariff reductions in ensuing years. According to conventional wisdom, delegation to the president sheltered Congress from constituent pressure thereby facilitating the opening of the US economy and the emergence of the United States as a world power. This article suggests a revision to our understanding of just how that occurred. Through a close study of the US… 
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