• Corpus ID: 40499048

Ambiguity in the Context of Probabilistic Beliefs

  title={Ambiguity in the Context of Probabilistic Beliefs},
  author={Klaus Nehring},
When are a decision maker's preferences compatible with speci ed probabilistic beliefs? We propose two de nitions of \compatibility" as possible answers to this question. The weaker one requires simply that the decision maker prefer to bet on an event whenever it is more likely. It is shown that under regularity conditions there exists a unique (incomplete) maximal comparative likelihood relation such that a given preference ordering is compatible with it. This relation yields a model-free… 

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