Altruism and Turnout

@article{Fowler2006AltruismAT,
  title={Altruism and Turnout},
  author={James H. Fowler},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  year={2006},
  volume={68},
  pages={674 - 683}
}
  • J. Fowler
  • Published 2006
  • Economics
  • The Journal of Politics
Scholars have recently reworked the traditional calculus of voting model by adding a term for benefits to others. Although the probability that a single vote affects the outcome of an election is quite small, the number of people who enjoy the benefit when the preferred alternative wins is large. As a result, people who care about benefits to others and who think one of the alternatives makes others better off are more likely to vote. I test the altruism theory of voting in the laboratory by… Expand
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