Altruism , reputation and noise in linear public goods experiments

  title={Altruism , reputation and noise in linear public goods experiments},
  author={Jef f rey E. Pr isbrey},
  • Jef f rey E. Pr isbrey
  • Published 1994
We report an experiment using a design that permits the direct measurement of individual decision rules in voluntary contribution games. We estimate the distribution of altruism in our subjects and find that observed "overcontribution" is attributable to a combination of random variation in behavior and a few altruistic players. We also employ Andreoni's partners/strangers design to measure reputation effects. The only difference observed is that the strangers treatment produces slightly more… CONTINUE READING
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Groups size effects in public goods provision : The voluntary contributions mechanism

J. M. Walker, S. H. Thomas
The Quarterl ] , Journal of Economics • 1988

Reputation and imperfect information

J. Roberts, R. Wilson
Journal of Economic Theory • 1982

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