Almost Envy-Freeness with General Valuations

@article{Plaut2017AlmostEW,
  title={Almost Envy-Freeness with General Valuations},
  author={Benjamin Plaut and Tim Roughgarden},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2017},
  volume={abs/1707.04769}
}
The goal of fair division is to distribute resources among competing players in a "fair" way. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied fairness notion in fair division. Envy-free allocations do not always exist with indivisible goods, motivating the study of relaxed versions of envy-freeness. We study the envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) property, which states that no player prefers the bundle of another player following the removal of any single good, and prove the first general results… 

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