Almost Envy-Freeness in Group Resource Allocation

@article{Kyropoulou2019AlmostEI,
  title={Almost Envy-Freeness in Group Resource Allocation},
  author={Maria Kyropoulou and Warut Suksompong and Alexandros A. Voudouris},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2019},
  volume={abs/1901.08463}
}
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods between groups of agents using the recently introduced relaxations of envy-freeness. We consider the existence of fair allocations under different assumptions on the valuations of the agents. In particular, our results cover cases of arbitrary monotonic, responsive, and additive valuations, while for the case of binary valuations we fully characterize the cardinalities of two groups of agents for which a fair allocation can be… Expand
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A new model where the agents are not partitioned into groups in advance, but instead the partition can be chosen in conjunction with the allocation of the goods and it is shown that for agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations, there is always a partition of the agents into two groups of any given sizes. Expand
Almost Group Envy-free Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Chores
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This work takes the group envy-freeness concept that is well-established in the literature and presents stronger and relaxed versions that are especially suitable for the allocation of indivisible items, and presents a clear taxonomy of the fairness concepts. Expand
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