All-Pay auctions with negative prize externalities : Theory and experimental evidence

@inproceedings{Sacco2008AllPayAW,
  title={All-Pay auctions with negative prize externalities : Theory and experimental evidence},
  author={Dario Sacco},
  year={2008}
}
The paper characterizes the mixed-strategy equilibria in all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes that depend positively on own effort and negatively on the effort of competitors. Such auctions arise naturally in the context of investment games, lobbying games, and promotion tournaments. We also provide an experimental analysis of a special case which captures the strategic situation of a two-stage game with investment preceding homogenous Bertrand competition. We obtain overinvestment both… CONTINUE READING

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