Alias Smith and Jones: The testimony of the senses

  title={Alias Smith and Jones: The testimony of the senses},
  author={Richard C. Jeffrey},
  • R. Jeffrey
  • Published 1 May 1987
  • Computer Science
  • Erkenntnis
Probabilistic accounts of judgment can disappoint dogmatically rooted expectations, i.e., expectations rooted in cases where simple ac? ceptance and rejection are appropriate attitudes toward hypotheses, and where evidence can be expected to simply verify or falsify hypotheses. But probabilistic judgment, freed from the two endpoints, can rate hypotheses anywhere in the unit interval, and can do the same for evidence itself. Where the reliability of signs and witnesses is an issue, dogmatism… Expand
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  • Medicine, Philosophy
  • Studies in history and philosophy of science
  • 2015
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  • Computer Science
  • Encyclopedia of Machine Learning and Data Mining
  • 2017
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  • D. Garber
  • Mathematics
  • Philosophy of Science
  • 1980