Corpus ID: 216523088

Alexander Bickel and the Demise of Legal Process Jurisprudence

@inproceedings{Wolitz2019AlexanderBA,
  title={Alexander Bickel and the Demise of Legal Process Jurisprudence},
  author={David Wolitz},
  year={2019}
}
This article provides an intellectual history of the displacement of Legal Process theory as the predominant jurisprudential approach in American law. The Legal Process approach to law embedded a strict norm of principled adjudication within a larger pragmatic theory of law. Alexander Bickel understood that the Legal Process theory of adjudication clashed with its commitment to pragmatic governance. The country, Bickel believed, could tolerate only so much principled decisionmaking — “No… Expand

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 24 REFERENCES
The Timing of the Same-Sex Marriage Case and Bickel's Passive Virtues
  • VOLOKH CON-SPIRACY
  • 2013
An Essay on the Passive Virtue of Baker v. State, 25 VT
  • L. REV
  • 2000
The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29
  • J. LEGAL STUD
  • 2000
Between 1963 and 1973, the socio-political conditions for the legal process synthesis ended
  • 1994
The Warren Court as History: An Interpretation
  • THE WAR-REN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 3-4 (Mark Tushnet
  • 1993
The Substance of the New Legal Process
Congress did eventually eliminate the kind of mandatory appeal that applied to the Naim case. See Supreme Court Case Selections Act of
  • 1988
Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law
The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX
  • L. REV
  • 1975
...
1
2
3
...