Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth

@article{Lynch2004AlethicFA,
  title={Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth},
  author={Michael P. Lynch},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2004},
  volume={145},
  pages={29-43}
}
According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the view’s main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes “true” as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims. 

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