Alea Iacta Est: Auctions, Persuasion, Interim Rules, and Dice

@article{Dughmi2018AleaIE,
  title={Alea Iacta Est: Auctions, Persuasion, Interim Rules, and Dice},
  author={Shaddin Dughmi and David Kempe and Ruixin Qiang},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2018},
  volume={abs/1811.11417}
}
  • Shaddin Dughmi, David Kempe, Ruixin Qiang
  • Published in ITCS 2018
  • Mathematics, Computer Science, Economics
  • To select a subset of samples or "winners" from a population of candidates, order sampling [Rosen 1997] and the k-unit Myerson auction [Myerson 1981] share a common scheme: assign a (random) score to each candidate, then select the k candidates with the highest scores. We study a generalization of both order sampling and Myerson's allocation rule, called winner-selecting dice. The setting for winner-selecting dice is similar to auctions with feasibility constraints: candidates have random types… CONTINUE READING

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