• Corpus ID: 118278503

Aggregate Preferred Correspondence and the Existence of a MREE

  title={Aggregate Preferred Correspondence and the Existence of a MREE},
  author={Anuj Bhowmik and Jiling Cao and Nicholas C. Yannelis},
  journal={arXiv: Functional Analysis},
In this paper, a general model of a pure exchange differential information economy is studied. In this economic model, the space of states of nature is a complete probability measure space, the space of agents is a measure space with a finite measure, and the commodity space is the Euclidean space. Under appropriate and standard assumptions on agents' characteristics, results on continuity and measurability of the aggregate preferred correspondence in the sense of Aumann in [4] are established… 


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