Against conditionalization

  title={Against conditionalization},
  author={Fahiem Bacchus and Henry E. Kyburg and Mariam Thalos},
Bayesian epistemology is marked by a scruple for compliance with the probability axioms. One cornerstone of Bayesian epistemology is the doctrine of personalism, the view according to which an agent's beliefs are not the mechanical result of conditionalizing a logical probability over her total history of observational experience. Another cornerstone of Bayesian epistemology is the teaching that since personalism is true, epistemic injunctions must be issued to rational agents to procure their… Expand
Objective Bayesianism, Bayesian conditionalisation and voluntarism
The main task of this paper is to show that this objection backfires: the difference between the two forms of updating reflects negatively on Bayesian conditionalisation rather than on objective Bayesian updating. Expand
The Basic Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism 1 . 1 The Probability Axioms and the Dutch Book Theorem
The Dutch Book argument (DBA) for probabilism (namely the view that an agent’s degrees of belief should satisfy the axioms of probability) traces to Ramsey’s work in “Truth and Probability”. HeExpand
On background: using two-argument chance
Writing the objective probability of q given r as P(q, r), it is argued that r may be chosen to provide less than a complete and exact description of the world’s history or of its state at any time. Expand
Structured Deliberation for Dynamic Uncertain Inference
The method presented here may be reconciled with Bayesian belief models by noting that the latter lack a consensus view of how stable beliefs form in the first place, and so complementary rather than antagonistic to subjective probability methods. Expand
Triviality Pursuit
The thesis that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities has putatively been refuted many times by so-called ‘triviality results’, although it has also enjoyed a number ofExpand
Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?
It is concluded that it is both possible and desirable to invoke norms for rational argument, and that a Bayesian approach provides solid normative principles with which to do so. Expand
Bayesian Informal Logic and
The theory of probability is at bottom nothing more than good sense reduced to a calculus. Abstract. Bayesian reasoning has been applied formally to statistical inference, machine learning andExpand
Modelling uncertain inference
  • C. Howson
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
  • Synthese
  • 2011
It is argued that an alternative version of Bayesian theory, proposed by both de Finetti and Ramsey, is less vulnerable to Kyburg’s misgivings and is both more natural and avoids other, widely-made objections to Bayesianism. Expand
Beyond linear conciliation
  • K. Kuan
  • Computer Science
  • Synthese
  • 2020
This paper aims to show that one may save the Conciliatory View by conciliating with nonlinear functions and suggest epistemologists develop a more fine-grained taxonomy for cases of disagreement with a deliberate categorisation of different kinds of disagreement. Expand
A Material Theory of Induction
It is argued that there are no universal inductive inference schemas and that a material theory no longer separates the factual and schematic parts of an induction, it proves not to be vulnerable to Hume’s problem of the justification of induction. Expand


Conditionalization and observation
I take bayesianism to be the doctrine which maintains that (i) a set of reasonable beliefs can be represented by a probability function defined over sentences or propositions, and that (ii)Expand
Dutch Bookies and Money Pumps
C ONCLUSIVE arguments in philosophy are rare, so any such argument we find we prize. If it is not only conclusive but clever, all the better for it. The Dutch book arguments of the theory ofExpand
Calibration, Coherence, and Scoring Rules
Surveys designed to display calibration curves, from which a recalibration is to be calculated, are useless without due consideration for the interconnections between questions (forecasts) in the survey. Expand
Belief and Will
absolutely right or wrong? because no moral legislation has its basis in pure ethics. But the pertinent questions are: Will prohibitory legislation, if enacted, do harm or good ? Will it educate theExpand
  • P. Baillie
  • Philosophy
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 1973
I In 1955 papers by Kemeny, Shimony and Lehman appeared which purport to establish the probability axioms as the axioms of confirmation.' The three articles are adaptations of the Dutch Book ArgumentExpand
The logical foundations of statistical inference
the logical foundations of statistical interference. Book lovers, when you need a new book to read, find the book here. Never worry not to find what you need. Is the the logical foundations ofExpand
Subjective probability: Considerations, re ections, and problems
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Dynamic coherence
  • Foundations of Statistical Inference, pages 233{243. Reidel
  • 1987
Dynamic coherence. In MacNeill and Umphrey, editors, Foundations of Statistical Inference, pages 233{243
  • Reidel, Dordrecht,
  • 1987
Re ections of two principles of bayesian epistemology
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  • 1987