Against a universal definition of 'Type'


What is the definition of 'type'? Having a clear and precise answer to this question would avoid many misunderstandings and prevent meaningless discussions that arise from them. But having such clear and precise answer to this question would also hurt science, "hamper the growth of knowledge" and "deflect the course of investigation into narrow channels of things already understood". In this essay, I argue that not everything we work with needs to be precisely defined. There are many definitions used by different communities, but none of them applies universally. A brief excursion into philosophy of science shows that this is not just tolerable, but necessary for progress. Philosophy also suggests how we can think about this imprecise notion of type.

DOI: 10.1145/2814228.2814249

Extracted Key Phrases

Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Petricek2015AgainstAU, title={Against a universal definition of 'Type'}, author={Tomas Petricek}, booktitle={Onward!}, year={2015} }