Against Time Bias*

@article{Greene2015AgainstTB,
  title={Against Time Bias*},
  author={Preston Greene and Meghan Sullivan},
  journal={Ethics},
  year={2015},
  volume={125},
  pages={947 - 970}
}
Most of us display a bias toward the near: we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in our near future and painful experiences to be in our distant future. We also display a bias toward the future: we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in our future and painful experiences to be in our past. While philosophers have tended to think that near bias is a rational defect, almost no one finds future bias objectionable. In this essay, we argue that this hybrid position is untenable. We conclude that… 

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