Affective representation and affective attitudes

  title={Affective representation and affective attitudes},
  author={Jonathan Mitchell},
Many philosophers have understood the representational dimension of affective states along the model of perceptual experiences. This paper argues affective experiences involve a kind of personal level affective representation disanalogous from the representational character of perceptual experiences. The positive thesis is that affective representation is a non-transparent, non-sensory form of evaluative representation, whereby a felt valenced attitude represents the object of the experience as… Expand
2 Citations
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