Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market

  title={Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market},
  author={Amy N. Finkelstein and James M. Poterba},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  pages={183 - 208}
We use a unique data set of annuities in the United Kingdom to test for adverse selection. We find systematic relationships between ex post mortality and annuity characteristics, such as the timing of payments and the possibility of payments to the annuitant's estate. These patterns are consistent with the presence of asymmetric information. However, we find no evidence of substantive mortality differences by annuity size. These results suggest that the absence of selection on one contract… 

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