Advancing without Attacking: The Strategic Game around the Use of Force

  title={Advancing without Attacking: The Strategic Game around the Use of Force},
  author={Dan Altman},
  journal={Security Studies},
  pages={58 - 88}
  • D. Altman
  • Published 16 August 2017
  • Business
  • Security Studies
ABSTRACT What is the nature of the strategic game that states play during crises? Extensive research examines the leading answer: coercive bargaining. States prevail by signaling resolve, establishing the credibility of their threats, and coercing their adversaries into backing down. However, instead of (or in addition to) traditional coercive bargaining, this article shows that states frequently play out a different game with its own set of rules and tactics. The article explores how states… 
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