Adolescent development and juvenile justice.

  title={Adolescent development and juvenile justice.},
  author={Laurence D. Steinberg},
  journal={Annual review of clinical psychology},
  • L. Steinberg
  • Published 27 March 2009
  • Psychology
  • Annual review of clinical psychology
Although justice system policy and practice cannot, and should not, be dictated solely by studies of adolescent development, the ways in which we respond to juvenile offending should be informed by the lessons of developmental science. This review begins with a brief overview of the history, rationale, and workings of the American juvenile justice system. Following this, I summarize findings from studies of brain, cognitive, and psychosocial development in adolescence that have implications for… 

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