Admissibility in Games ∗

@inproceedings{Brandenburger2006AdmissibilityIG,
  title={Admissibility in Games ∗},
  author={Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg and H. Jerome Keisler},
  year={2006}
}
Suppose that each player in a game is rational, each player thinks the other players are rational, and so on. Also, suppose that rationality is taken to incorporate an admissibility requirement–i.e., the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies. Which strategies can be played? We provide an epistemic framework in which to address this question. Specifically, we formulate conditions of “rationality and mth-order assumption of rationality” (RmAR) and “rationality and common assumption of… CONTINUE READING
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