Adaptive variation in judgment and philosophical intuition

  title={Adaptive variation in judgment and philosophical intuition},
  author={Edward T. Cokely and Adam Feltz},
  journal={Consciousness and Cognition},
Individual differences in theory-of-mind judgments: Order effects and side effects
We explore and provide an account for a recently identified judgment anomaly, i.e., an order effect that changes the strength of intentionality ascriptions for some side effects (e.g., when a
Intuitions about personal identity: An empirical study
Williams (1970) argues that our intuitions about personal identity vary depending on how a given thought experiment is framed. Some frames lead us to think that persistence of self requires
Extraversion and compatibilist intuitions: a ten-year retrospective and meta-analyses
ABSTRACT The past ten years have seen multiple attempts to estimate the relation between the global personality trait extraversion and compatibilist free will judgments. Here, we contribute to that
The evolution of misbelief
A range of potential candidates for evolved misbelief are explored, and it is concluded that, of those surveyed, only positive illusions meet the criteria.
Perspective in intentional action attribution
In two experiments, we demonstrate that intentional action intuitions vary as a function of whether one brings about or observes an event. In experiment 1a (N = 38), participants were less likely to
Philosophical theorizing is often, either tacitly or explicitly, guided by intuitions about cases. Theories that accord with our intuitions are generally considered to be prima facie better than
Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge
Experimental restrictionists have challenged philosophers’ reliance on intuitions about thought experiment cases based on experimental findings. According to the expertise defense, only the
Experimental philosophy of actual and counterfactual free will intuitions
  • Adam Feltz
  • Psychology, Philosophy
    Consciousness and Cognition
  • 2015
Moral responsibility and free will: A meta-analysis
Actor-observer differences in intentional action intuitions.
Actor-Observer Differences in Intentional Action Intuitions Adam Feltz ( Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies, 2100 Memorial Blvd. Kerrville, TX 78028, USA Maegan A. Harris


The fragmented folk : More evidence of stable individual differences in moral judgments and folk intuitions
In a series of five experiments, we demonstrate that moral judgments and folk intuitions are often predictably fragmented. Drawing on the domains of ethics and action theory, we illustrate ways in
Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making
This paper introduces a three-item "Cognitive Reflection Test" (CRT) as a simple measure of one type of cognitive ability—the ability or disposition to reflect on a question and resist reporting the
Temperament and intuition: A commentary on Feltz and Cokely
Simple predictions fueled by capacity limitations: when are they successful?
Modeling both hypotheses in ACT-R demonstrates that simpler predictions impair performance if the environment changes, whereas a more exaggerated perception of correlation is advantageous to detect a change.
Folk concepts and intuitions: from philosophy to cognitive science
The Power of Personality: The Comparative Validity of Personality Traits, Socioeconomic Status, and Cognitive Ability for Predicting Important Life Outcomes
The influence of personality traits on important life outcomes is demonstrated, the need to more routinely incorporate measures of personality into quality of life surveys is highlighted, and further research is encouraged about the developmental origins of personality trait and the processes by which these traits influence diverse life outcomes.
How forgetting aids heuristic inference.
Simulations of the recognition heuristic demonstrate that forgetting can boost accuracy by increasing the chances that only 1 object is recognized, and that loss of information aids inference heuristics that exploit mnemonic information.