Adaptive Dynamics with Interaction Structure

  title={Adaptive Dynamics with Interaction Structure},
  author={Benjamin Allen and Martin A. Nowak and Ulf Dieckmann},
  journal={The American Naturalist},
  pages={E139 - E163}
Evolutionary dynamics depend critically on a population’s interaction structure—the pattern of which individuals interact with which others, depending on the state of the population and the environment. Previous research has shown, for example, that cooperative behaviors disfavored in well-mixed populations can be favored when interactions occur only between spatial neighbors or group members. Combining the adaptive dynamics approach with recent advances in evolutionary game theory, we here… 

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