Adams Conditioning and Likelihood Ratio Transfer Mediated Inference

  title={Adams Conditioning and Likelihood Ratio Transfer Mediated Inference},
  author={Jan A. Bergstra},
Bayesian inference as applied in a legal setting is about belief transfer and involves a plurality of agents and communication protocols. A forensic expert (FE) may communicate to a trier of fact (TOF) first its value of a certain likelihood ratio with respect to FE's belief state as represented by a probability function on FE's proposition space. Subsequently FE communicates its recently acquired confirmation that a certain evidence proposition is true. Then TOF performs likelihood ratio… Expand
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