Ad Hoc Auxiliary Hypotheses and Falsificationism

  title={Ad Hoc Auxiliary Hypotheses and Falsificationism},
  author={Adolf Gr{\"u}nbaum},
  journal={The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
  pages={329 - 362}
  • A. Grünbaum
  • Published 1 December 1976
  • Psychology
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
In the history of science, there are various instances of theory-modification by auxiliary hypotheses, as distinct from wholesale theory-replacement. And these instances include familiar episodes in which the new auxiliaries prompted cries of ad hoc, epistemic caveats or at least a clear appreciation of considerable epistemic risk from some segments of the scientific community. In each such episode, a modifying collateral assumption H repaired a troubled major theory T1 by then enabling the… 
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  • 1972
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  • 1960
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  • Philosophy
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  • 1976
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  • 1959
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