Ad Exchanges: Research Issues

@inproceedings{Muthukrishnan2009AdER,
  title={Ad Exchanges: Research Issues},
  author={S. Muthukrishnan},
  booktitle={WINE},
  year={2009}
}
An emerging way to sell and buy display ads on the Internet is via ad exchanges. RightMedia [1], AdECN [2] and DoubleClick Ad Exchange [3] are examples of such real-time two-sided markets. We describe an abstraction of this market. Based on that abstraction, we present several research directions and discuss some insights. 
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